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This paper develops a growth theory that accounts for the evolution of trade
policy, underlying internal class con￿ icts, and global income divergence over
the last few centuries. By analyzing political responses to the distributional
e⁄ects of international trade, this paper ￿nds a prominent interaction between
trade policy and the pattern of economic development, and suggests that
the nature of the interaction depends on a country￿ s resource abundance
and distribution. As shown by the example of Western Europe, land-scarce
countries will reach a developed stage through a non-monotonic evolution
of trade policy. In contrast, land-abundant countries, especially those with
concentrated landownership, tend to fail to take o⁄ because of landlords￿
opposition to industrialization.
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EUI WP ECO 2005/31 Introduction
Over the last two centuries, he world economy has witnessed two epochal phenomena never seen
before: the rapid expansion of international trade and income gaps across nations. The approximate
growth rate of intercontinental trade was 3.5 percent per annum in this period, while the ￿gure
was 1.1 percent per annum between 1500 and 1800 (O￿ Rourke and Williamson 2001, Table 1). The
gap between the West and the rest of the world in average per capita GDP was nearly 2:1 in 1820,
whereas it was as much as 7:1 in 1998 (Maddison 2001, Table 1-9b, 46).
While these ￿gures have brought a potential link between international trade and long-run
growth performance to many economists￿attention, there seems to be no established theory to
account for their historical relationship. As pointed out by Williamson (2003), the role of inter-
national trade has typically been neglected by a recent literature analyzing the transition from
Malthusian stagnation to modern growth.1 Even the few exceptions, such as McDermott (2002)
and Galor and Mountford (2003), treat the emergence of international trade as exogenously given.2
On the other hand, the literature on endogenous tari⁄theory primarily builds on static frameworks,
silent to the dynamic aspects of trade and aggregate output.3
This research distinguishes itself from these previous articles by exploring the historical evolution
of trade policy and economic development. Analyzing political response to the distributional e⁄ects
of trade, the research ￿nds a prominent interaction between these two factors, and emphasizes the
role of international trade in income divergence across countries.
The analysis is focused on the development of Western Europe since the 18th century, consist-
ing of four distinct epochs of trade policy.4 In the ￿rst epoch (1700-1830s), Western European
1See, for example, Goodfriend and McDermott (1995), Galor and Weil (2000), Kogel and Prskawetz (2001) and
Hansen and Prescott (2002).
2There are two other notable articles relevant to the present paper. McDermott (1999) endogenizes a country￿ s
openness by introducing the government￿ s motivation for mercantilistic protection against the in￿ ow of foreign ideas.
In contrast to the present article, he does not study international trade in commodities and hence overlooks the
substantial impact of grain in￿ ow on the 19th-century European economy. Baldwin et al. (2001) develop a growth
model in which exogenous improvements in various costs of trading goods (such as shipping costs and political
barriers) promote industrial agglomeration in the North and thereby provoke great income divergence between the
North and South.
3See Mayer (1984), Magee, Brock and Young (1989), and Grossman and Helpman (1994), among others.
4International trade is considered as between Western Europe and the rest of the world, including Eastern Europe.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Amsterdam played a central role in determining the grain prices in Europe
(Glamann 1974, 457). In the course of the 18th century England and France shifted from intra-European trade to
intercontinental trade (Kriedte 1983, Chap.3), and the late 18th century was the time when the Atlantic trade became
the engine of European economic growth (ibid., 125). For example, Carolina￿ s rice exports enlarged ￿ve-hold between
1720 and 1740 (Nash 1992, 687).
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adversely a⁄ecting most people￿ s living standards. The second epoch (1830s-1870s) was marked by
a decisive shift towards free trade. The resulting in￿ ux of grain, especially from the New World,
had substantial impacts on income distribution within societies. In response to the grain invasion,
many of these nations went back to the protection of domestic agriculture, a competing sector.
This political backlash characterizes the third epoch, which has continued until today. On top of
these three historical stages, the theory predicts the second wave of globalization in the fourth and
￿nal stage. Thus, the evolution of trade policy generally encompasses two surges of liberalism with
a stage of protectionism in between.
This paper accomplishes two intriguing objectives. The ￿rst and main objective is to analyze
the non-monotonic evolution of trade policy experienced by Western Europe, a region plausibly
regarded to be scarce in land and abundant in capital.5 This non-monotonicity re￿ ects qualitative
changes in individuals￿preferences towards trade liberalization, and their attitudes vary with the
degree of economic development. The present paper provides an interest-based explanation for
the determination of openness through an internal political process, rather than political games
between trading countries. The second objective is to identify one of the prime sources of global
income divergence.6
The theoretical model constructed later describes a two-sector, two-good, overlapping-generations
economy incorporating two speci￿c factors: land and physical capital, and one mobile factor: hu-
man capital.7 Three key elements are featured in this model. The ￿rst is the absolute importance
of food for people in poverty. To be more precise, for the sake of survival people need to spend
their incomes exclusively on food up to a certain consumption level. This consumer behavior can
5According to a careful investigation by Rogowski (1989, pp.154-158), as late as 1600 Northwestern Europe was
abundant in capital and scarce in land, whereas Eastern Europe was abundant in land and scarce in capital. During
the 16th century the vast granaries of eastern Germany and Poland had achieved rapid growth, and by the ￿rst half
of the 17th centuy an annual average of 140,000 tons of grain ￿ owed into Western Europe through the Danish Sound
(De Vries 1976, 33). Although England was a net exporter of many grains in the ￿rst half of the 18th century, this
fact was largely because of the bounty and thus was called ￿a forced export￿(Ormrod 2003, 216-217).
6The interest-based approach is taken by Rogowski (1989), who applies the Stolper-Samuelson theorem to inter-
pret class and rural/urban con￿ icts over trade policies within 19th-century European nations. However, he neither
constructs a formal model nor discusses the determination of trade policy. The present article goes beyond these
two points in order to analyze the dynamic interaction between trade policy and economic development, with class
con￿ icts being by-products of this interaction.
7While the model is an extension of Galor and Moav￿ s (2004) one-sector, one-good growth model, their research
accomplishes a saliently di⁄erent objective: They examine the e⁄ects of (exogenous) distributional policies on output
growth in a closed economy, and ￿nd that the qualitative e⁄ects depend on the stage of development.
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tion factors. As in Mayer (1984), voting is conducted by individuals who invest in several factors,
although human capital is not incorporated into his model. A shift in portfolio composition in the
growth process alters individual trade policy preferences. The last element is credit-market imper-
fection, which leads to borrowing constraints facing agents who invest in a broad range of skills.8
Credit-constrained individuals will pro￿tably invest all resources in education, in the presence of
the decreasing (constant) returns to scale with respect to investment in human (physical) capital.
Hence in underdeveloped stages, wage income, not capital revenues, is the major income source for
all but the very rich.
The theory predicts the following scenario for the evolution of a land-scarce, capital-abundant
economy. In the early stages of development, the economy operates in a closed system where per
capita output of the agricultural product remains constant. Because of the scarcity of land and
the necessity for food, the agricultural sector absorbs a substantial amount of labor, depressing the
wage in terms of food. The landless poor are thus obliged to devote their entire incomes to food
consumption and cannot a⁄ord to invest in skill-acquisition. This binding subsistence constraint in
autarky sustains landlords￿economic dominance at the expense of the rest￿ s poverty. In contrast,
engaging in international trade would break down this class structure by placing egalitarian pressure
on income distribution: On the one hand, it would raise the wage in terms of food through labor
out￿ ows from agriculture, mitigating the cost of living for low-income classes. On the other hand,
free trade would reduce real rents and thus landlords￿incomes. These two egalitarian forces of
globalization￿ the rise of the working class and fall of the landed elite￿ are a prime incentive for
landlords to prefer autarky. This implies that the initial development process entails a political
struggle between the landed and landless classes. Provided that the wealthy class wields political
power, the economy adopts protectionist policies re￿ ecting the landlords￿position.
While free trade enhances landlords￿revenues accrued from industrial capital, this positive e⁄ect
is not dominant in early stages where industrial capital is a minor asset in their portfolios. However,
the accumulation of industrial capital, in conjunction with a limited supply of land, gradually
8The credit market imperfection approach has been extensively taken by recent theoretical articles examining the
e⁄ects of income distribution on economic growth. They include Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galor and Zeira
(1993), and Benabou (1996). Perotti (1996) and Flug et al.(1998) ￿nd empirical support for the signi￿cance of the
credit-market imperfection as a barrier to educational attainment.
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pro￿table for landlords. Accordingly, landlords come to vote for free trade and the economy opens
up to international trade. Note that this epochal regime switch dissolves the class con￿ ict in trade
policy due to the cost-of-living e⁄ect mentioned earlier.
As the economy develops under free trade, further specialization in manufacturing raises the
agricultural wage, easing the subsistence constraint binding the working class. This improvement in
living standards changes the behavior of landless workers fundamentally in two respects. First, now
that they consume the manufactured good as well as food, the wage in terms of the manufactured
good becomes an important element in their real wage. Second, they begin to invest in skill-
acquisition, pushing their incomes further above the subsistence level of food consumption. In
these circumstances people in the working class may become less supportive of pro-global (i.e.pro-
industrial and anti-agricultural) policies since specialization in manufacturing leads to a lower
capital-labor ratio in industry and hence to a lower wage in terms of the manufactured good. It
should be stressed that the magnitude of their opposition to liberalization largely hinges on the
amount of agricultural land. Consistent with the historical evidence given below, protection of
agriculture will be intense in moderately land-scarce countries (e.g., Germany and France), where
the negative e⁄ect of free trade on workers￿ the decline in the industrial wage￿ is dominant. Hence,
noting that the rise in the middle class income will lead to the extension of the franchise, their
political participation results in the resurgence of protectionism. By contrast, the retreat into
protectionism does not take place in severely land-scarce countries (e.g., the United Kingdom).
Unless the political backlash is overwhelming, the accumulation of physical and human cap-
ital continues to boost output and real wages. The growing economy ultimately reaches highly
developed stages where the credit constraint dissipates and members of the landless class invest in
education as well as in industrial capital. These newly emerging capitalists form a major interest
group in society and support pro-global policies. This is because agricultural land has little value in
highly industrialized stages and hence maximizing aggregate output, which occurs under free trade,
coincides with maximizing the real wage for the landless class. This result should be interpreted
as a prediction of trade policy in unreached, highly developed stages, given the fact that most
currently developed countries still adhere to agricultural protection.
The second part of this article demonstrates that the size of landownership is a prime determi-
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for whom land rents are the most important income source, have a strong incentive to protect agri-
culture and substantial amounts of capital are required for them to turn to pro-industrial, liberal
policies. Therefore, a country that has abundant land and a small number of landowners is likely
to remain protectionist.
It is worthwhile discussing several empirical aspects of the speci￿cation of the above model. The
model can be viewed as a rami￿cation of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, in the sense that it enables us
to explore the e⁄ects of relative commodity price on factor prices. Although many empirical papers
using the postwar data report the poor performance of the Heckscher-Ohlin model (e.g. Leontief
1953 and Tre￿ er 1995), O￿ Rourke et al.(1996) con￿rm its better performance in the late 19th
century. Their results indicate that the factor-price convergence between the Old and New Worlds
in this period was driven by commodity-price convergence, supporting the factor-price-equalization
theorem.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 o⁄ers supporting evidence for European
trade policy and economic development. Section 3 outlines the basic structure of the model and
Section 4 derives a short-run equilibrium. Section 5 analyzes individuals￿trade-policy preferences,
which hinge on their wealth levels. Section 6 demonstrates the endogenous evolution of trade
policy and aggregate output experienced by industrial economies. Section 7 investigates the role of
international trade in income divergence across countries, and Section 8 concludes the discussion.
Some proofs of technical results are placed in the Appendix.
2 Historical Evidence
This section presents historical evidence of Western European trade policy and economic develop-
ment, supporting the central argument of the paper.9 As mentioned in the introduction, this paper
considers both intra-European and intercontinental trade, and the exploration dwells on the role of
trade policy, rather than transportation costs, in determining a country￿ s openness. The following
four epochs construct a broad picture of the history of Western European trade policy over the last
three centuries.
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Protectionism was a prevailing doctrine in Europe during this periods, and the import of grains was
forcefully constrained by a series of national laws. The most well-known and important example was
the British Corn Laws, which lasted until 1846.10 According to Bairoch (1989, 7-8), ￿It should be
noted that ￿ Corn Laws￿were a quasi-permanent feature of tari⁄history in most European countries.
They had always aimed at a precarious balance between protecting local agriculture and preventing
the price of bread rising too steeply.￿For instance, Burke￿ s Act of 1773 ￿xed the threshold price
level on the home market, above which the import of wheat was allowed with customs duties, at
44 shillings per quarter, later raised to 80 shillings by the law of 1815 (ibid., 8).11 In France,
landowners succeeded in introducing a sliding scale tari⁄ to protect cereals between 1815 and 1845
(Fohlen 1973, 30). Prior to the 19th century protectionist policies against foreign grains were
generally binding intra-European trade, rather than intercontinental trade.12
The absence of grain imports kept European economies under agricultural-land constraints.
Using British data between 1565-1936, O￿ Rourke and Williamson (2000) ￿nd a clear association
between commodity and factor prices and endowments for the pre-1828 periods, but note a break-
down in this relationship after 1828 rather than after the 1490s, the era of the Voyages of Discovery.
Based on this ￿nding they suggest the superiority of the closed model over the open-economy model
before 1828, and the latter￿ s superiority to the former after 1828.
Working class living standards did not improve in the ￿rst epoch; rather they were deteriorating.
For instance, Allen (2001, 427-429) reports that welfare indicators of laborers in many European
cities exhibited downward or stationary trends during 1500-1800, remaining at the levels where
10The term ￿ Corn￿did not merely mean American corn or maize, rather the term meant grains such as wheat,
oats, rye, varley, malt, peas, beans and maize (Barnes 1965, 7). Although the Corn Laws existed prior to 1660, it is
after 1660 that the government restricted the import of grain and encouraged the export of it (Barnes 1965, 8 and
Glamann 1974, 465). Apart from the UK, most European countries were protectionist at latest in the early 19th
century (Bairoch 1989, 7). This paper conventionally sets 1660 as the initial period.
11A quarter of wheat was 217:7 kg. The import of wheat was subject to customs duties.
12It appears that intercontinental trade in grains were not a main agenda for pre-19th century policy makers due
to enormous freight costs. Some historians such as Irwin (2001) and Taylor (2002) are in favor of the view that it was
underdeveloped shipping technology, rather than protective policy, that constrained intercontinental trade between
the 16th and 18th centuries. While Europe engaged in trade with other continents such as the New World, Asia and
India after the Voyages of Discovery, most traded commodities between 1500-1800 were non-competing luxury goods,
which had high values compared with their transport costs: e.g.pepper, other spices, cotton textiles, tea and co⁄ee
from Asia, and sugar, tobacco and silver from the Americas (Findlay and O￿ Rourke 2001, 7-10 and Table 1). Since
luxury goods were out of the budget of low-income groups, with respect to living standards intercontinental trade
was of little relevance to all Europeans except the elite (Irwin 2001 and Williamson 2002c, 16).
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the period between 1500 and about 1800, both unskilled labor and luxury goods generally became
cheaper relative to staple foods (grains and bread) in major European regions (Table 2 and Figure
1, 331-333), and that grain shares were larger in working class budgets than in upper class budgets
in England and Wales, France, and the Netherlands (Table 1, 326-327).13 The proposed theory
predicts the rise in the relative price of food in autarky￿ a result consistent with the trend in
this epoch. What needs to be emphasized is that sustained mass poverty was a major force that
constrained the productive activities of most Europeans.
2.2 The First Globalization, 1830s-1870s
The triumph of liberalism was symbolized by Britain￿ s repeal of the Corn Law in 1846.14 Williamson
(1990, Table 1, 128) estimates that the ad valorem tari⁄ equivalent on grain in Britain fell from
about 71 percent to about 22 percent between 1815 and 1845￿ a great step towards free trade. By
1850, wheat came into Britain continuously from Australia, Argentina, India, the middle west of
America and Canada, and the value of wheat exports from the U.S. multiplied by twenty-fold during
1850-1915 (Woodru⁄, 1973).15 In Germany, Belgium, and France, imports of grain accounted for
3 per cent of domestic production in the years 1862-6, reaching to 20 per cent in 1876-80 (Bairoch
1989, 47).
Britain￿ s liberal ideas spread over much of the European core, especially after 1860, when Britain
and France agreed on a commercial treaty including the most-favored-nation clause (Bairoch 1989,
40 and Minchinton 1973, 100).16 The spreading of the ideology of liberalism led to the dismantling
13In 1688-England and Wales, the bottom 40% of income groups spent about 35% of their incomes on bread and
other grain, whereas the top 5% spent only 4.2% on those goods. In France, rural workers spent 30.8% of their
incomes on bread and other grain in 1763, whereas middle and upper classes spent only 1.7% on them in 1788. This
implies that the relative price of grain was more important for living standards of poorer people.
14The present article conventionally de￿nes the1830s as the initial periods of the ￿rst globalization. While the
triumph of liberalism was symbolized by Britain￿ s repeal of the Corn Law in 1846, the onset of liberalism dates
back to the early 1820s. The progress of British liberalization was gradual but steady through the subsequent tari⁄
reforms. In 1822, the nation reduced the threshold price level mentioned above to 70 shillings per quarter (Bairoch
1989, 9). Customs duties on industiral products and raw materials were reduced as well (ibid., 9).
15The increase in the years after the late 19th century is accounted for largely by the improvements in transportation
costs and technology of wheat production, rather than by liberal trade policy, as agricultural protection was prevailing
during this period in Western Europe.
16￿The most-favoured-nation clause is a formula by which each of the two signatories to a treaty agrees to grant
the other any advantage, favour, or privilege with regard to trade or navigation that it granted at the time of signing,
or that it would grant in the future, to any other nation￿(Bairoch 1989, 38-39). According to Minchinton (1973,
100), the abolition of grain duties was conducted by the Zollverein in 1853, by Britain in 1860, by France and the
Netherlands in 1862, by Italy in 1870, and by Belgium in 1871.
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brought about two major changes in European economies. The ￿rst is improvements in within-
country wealth inequality. O￿ Rourke and Williamson (2003) report that in Northwestern Europe,
the wage-land rent ratio was rising prior to the 19th century and started falling at some point in
the century. The second is the specialization in capital-intensive goods, which shifts workers from
agricultural to industrial sectors. Britain￿ s agricultural workforce began to decline after 1850, a
decline tied both to new technologies and to massive increases in agricultural imports (Pomeranz
2000, 287). These two drastic changes indicate that trade liberalization and accompanying grain
in￿ ows caused a structural breakdown, transforming Western Europe from an autarkic to an open
economy and releasing it from resource constraints.17
Political power was wielded by the landed elite in most European nations during this epoch.
For example, Aydelotte (1967, 51) reckons that the share of the British aristocracy and gentry in
the house of commons was roughly 80 percent in 1846, the year of the Corn Law Repeal. Moreover,
as depicted in Figure 1, prior to the 1870s the franchise was limited to a small segment of the
population in the European core, except France. Since landlords were the richest class during this
period and the restriction of the franchise was based on the income level, the dominance of the
landed elite was perhaps the most common political characteristic in Europe. Hence many of the
landlords￿preferences were re￿ ected in the trade policies adopted, and trade liberalization would
not have been achieved without their substantial agreement.
One of the prime forces behind the policy switch to free trade was, as mentioned in the introduc-
tion, the rising relative importance of industrial capital in landlords￿portfolios.18 This hypothesis is
consistent with the empirical work by Schonhardt-Bailey (1991), who focuses on the case of Britain
in the ￿rst half of the 19th century. She documents growing diversi￿cation of the asset portfolios
of British landowners, and also ￿nds that the Members of Parliament representing constituencies
with greater diversi￿cation were more likely to vote for free trade. Likewise, Thompson (1994,
17In 1500, the number of persons per square mile in western Europe plus the New World was 26.7, and the ￿gure
declined to 9.0 by 1800 [Jones (1981, 82) and Webb (1952, 18)]. This is a substantial positive impact on European
resource constraints, counteracting the rapid population growth between the two periods.
18According to O￿ Rourke￿ s (2000) recent review of British trade policy, economic historians proposed two other
major reasons for the Corn Law Repeal. Kindleberger (1975) suggests that economic ideas convinced the voters of
the e¢ ciency of free trade. By contrast, Irwin (1989) argues that gradual distrust of the Malthusian and Recardian
theories prompted the prime minister Robert Peel to convert to liberalism. This research con￿nes its focus to one of
the potential sources of trade liberalization.
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United Kingdom 0 0
Continental Europe 19 25
Source. Bairoch (1989, Table 9, 76 and Table 16, 139).
166) documents the aristocracy￿ s decreasing dependence on agricultural incomes in 19th-century
England.19
2.3 Political Backlash, 1870s-
As shown by Minchinton (1973, 100), the retreat from free trade occurred in Italy in 1878, in
Germany in 1879, in France in 1881, in Bulgaria in 1883, in Switzerland in 1884, in Rumania in
1886, in Belgium and Sweden in 1887, in Austria-Hungary, Spain, Portugal and Russia in the same
decades.
The impact of cheap New World and Russian grain became evident in European markets by the
late 1870s and 1880s, as was apparent from the 50 percent decline in real British land rents between
1870 and 1913 (Findlay and O￿ Rourke 2001, 35). Many countries on the European continent re-
19An empirical study by Scheve and Slaughter (2001) provides indirect evidence for the view that the real estate
ownership a⁄ects trade-policy preference. Based on individual-level survey data for the United States in recent years,
they con￿rm that trade barriers were more likely to gain supports from individuals whose home ownerships were in
counties where comparative-disadvantage industries were concentrated. Home ownership in their study resembles the
ownership of agricultural land in this paper￿ s context.
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industrial sectors. This series of political backlashes are observed in the following time-series and
cross-sectional data. The time series data from Figures 2(a)-2(b) illustrate that several geographi-
cally large countries, such as Austria-Hungary, France, Germany and Italy, were generally raising
tari⁄s during this epoch, whereas the United Kingdom, a geographically small country, was not.20
In fact, the United Kingdom maintained free trade until 1932 (Bairoch 1989, 92). Turning to the
cross-sectional data, Table 1 shows that the European continent was on average more protectionist
against the import of wheat than that of manufactured goods. At country levels, this tendency
applies for Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and possibly Portugal. The
United Kingdom, again in sharp contrast, displays considerable and widespread liberalism. The
asymmetry in European political responses was initially pointed out by Kindleberger (1951, 33).
He argues that ￿The response of Germany, France, and Italy to the decline in the world price of
wheat was to impose tari⁄s in an attempt to maintain the relative price of wheat and to protect
grain producers,￿whereas ￿Like Britain, the Netherlands, and Belgium, Denmark did not impose
a tari⁄ on wheat.￿One plausible conjecture from these time-series and cross-sectional records is
that between the 1870s and 1913, core European countries generally became protectionist against
foreign trade, and that the protection was more intensive in agriculture than in industry.
One must bear in mind that the resurgence of protectionism was not powerful enough to cause
a return to the level of economic isolation prior to the ￿rst globalization (Williamson 2002a, 4). As
shown in Table 2, despite the pro-agricultural policies, European economies remained net importers
of primary products and net exporters of the manufactured goods in the beginning and at the end
of this epoch, and the opposite is the case for all the other regions.
Two empirical observations are consistent with this article￿ s view that the retreat into protec-
tionism was provoked in part by growing workers.21 First, Figure 1 clearly illustrates that many
European nations had a dramatic extension of the franchise towards the end of the 19th century,
implying that the middle class was gaining political in￿ uence. Second, a study by O￿ Rourke (1997)
quanti￿es the potential impact of cheap grain and ￿nds that the welfare e⁄ects of the grain invasion
20Between the 1870s and 1890s, the average tari⁄ rate increased from 4.4 to 10.1 percent in France, and 3.8 to 9.1
percent in Germany (Blattman et al. 2002, 5).
21Since there exist only two income classes in the economy considered below, the term ￿ workers￿includes small-size
capitalists, whose major income source is wages.
11
Endogenous Globalization and Income Divergence 
EUI WP ECO 2005/3Table 2 Values of Net Exports, 1876-80 and 1913
1876-80 1913
Region Primary Goods Manufactured Goods Primary Goods Manufactured Goods
United Kingdom ￿1245 640 ￿1836 1150
NW Europe ￿960 630 ￿2830 1523
Other Europe 235 ￿120 104 ￿555
USA and Canada 270 ￿90 559 ￿157
Oceania 326 ￿361






Sources. Findlay and O￿ Rourke (2001, Table 4) and originally from Lamartine Yates (1959).
*The average of Oceania, Latin America, Africa and Asia.
on workers vary across some European nations. As the present paper does, he focuses on two op-
posing e⁄ects of free trade on the real wage, which emerge in a standard rural-urban speci￿c-factors
model: the decline in the wage in terms of the manufactured good and the rise of the wage in terms
of food. By utilizing a CGE model whose parameters are based on empirical data, his analysis
￿nds that the former negative e⁄ect outweighed the latter positive e⁄ect in France, which had large
agricultural sectors, whereas the opposite was true for Britain, which had small agricultural sectors
(ibid., 792). Given these two results together, this article asserts that within Western Europe, the
di⁄erence in agricultural size may account for di⁄erent political responses to the grain invasion.
The protection in agricultural sectors has remained until today, as evidenced by the 2003 WTO
meeting in Mexico. Coppel and Durand (1999, Figure 1, 20) ￿nd stationary trends in producer
support estimates (PSE) in OECD countries￿agricultural sectors between 1986 and 1998. During
the period the PSEs remained at about 40% in the European Union, 20% in the United States and
60% in Japan￿ levels above the ones in Australia and New Zealand (ibid., 6). In contrast, trade
liberalization in manufactured goods has been successful. Findlay and O￿ Rourke (2001, Table 5,
67) document the declining trend in average tari⁄s on manufactured goods for 27 major countries
between 1913 and 1998. Intercontinental price gaps between 1950 and 2000 were cut by 76%, out
of which no less than 74% can be attributed to trade liberalization (Lindert and Williamson 2001,
Table 1). The reports above suggest that this substantial contribution of trade liberalization comes
12
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2.4 Summary
One lesson from the historical evidence presented so far is that a country￿ s trade policy varies over
time in accordance with the stage of economic development. A country may even experience a
non-monotonic evolution of trade policy in the growth process, as is evidenced by the political
backlash in 19th-century Germany and France. Another lesson is that the opening of an economy
to international trade paves the way to modern growth by delinking it from resource constraints.
Hence, international trade appears to be one of the key determinants for global income divergence.
The following sections explore the mechanism that generates the evolution of trade policy, aggregate
output, and individual living standards.
3 The Model
Consider a two-sector overlapping-generations economy that operates in a two-good world over
in￿nite discrete time. There are three factors of production: land, physical capital and human
capital. An agricultural good is produced in one sector by employing land and human capital,
while a manufactured good is produced in the other by using physical and human capital. The
accumulation of the two kinds of capital is the engine of economic growth; it occurs through private
investment in assets and education, subject to borrowing constraints. The supply of land and the
levels of population and technology are constant over time.22
The economy may take part in international trade of ￿nal goods with no e⁄ect on the world
market. While the world economy imposes no restriction on trade, the economy described below
may become protectionist. The government, through the internal political process, sets up the level
of a tari⁄ and thus the domestic prices as the only means of trade protection. Tari⁄ revenues are
not rebated to individuals but are spent completely on consumption by the government.
3.1 Production of Final Goods
The economy has perfectly competitive markets for both the ￿nal goods and the inputs, while
households rent the services of land, physical capital and human capital out to producers. Indepen-
22The inclusion of physical capital in agricultural production would not alter the basic results, as long as the
industrial capital accumlation promotes labor migration to the manufacturing sector.
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perfectly predict the future course of the economy. Human capital is completely mobile between
the sectors and all factors are, unlike ￿nal goods, immobile across countries. The supply of human
capital depends on the educational investment in the preceding period.
3.1.1 The Agricultural Sector
This sector generates the agricultural good, which is perishable and indispensable for survival, in
the production process governed by a neoclassical technology. Let Xt and HA
t denote the quantities
of land and human capital employed by this sector at time t. The output of the agricultural good
produced at time t, yA
t , is then
yA
t = F(Xt;HA
t ) = [aX
￿
t + (1 ￿ a)(HA
t )￿]1=￿; (1)
where a 2 (0;1) and ￿ 2 (￿1;0). The parameter restriction imposed on ￿ generates an upper
bound of output when one of their inputs are ￿xed in supply.23 The marginal productivity with
respect to each input goes to zero as the input becomes in￿nitely large, whereas the other Inada
conditions are not satis￿ed: The marginal productivity with respect to each input remains ￿nite
as the input approaches zero.
In contrast to individuals facing liquidity constraints, producers are allowed to rent land freely
on the grounds that land is easily collateralized compared to human capital. Hence, producers in
period t maximize their pro￿ts given pt, the price of the agricultural good, ￿t, the rental price per
unit of land, and wA
t , the wage per unit of human capital in period t. The manufactured good is
taken as the numeraire. This standard pro￿t-maximization is to maximize ptyA
t ￿ ￿tXt ￿ wA
t HA
t
with respect to Xt and HA








where X > 0 is a ￿xed supply of land and Fi denotes the partial derivative of function F with
respect to argument i (FH ￿ @F(￿)=@HA
t for simplicity).24
23As will become apparent, the economy characterized by ￿ = 0 (i.e., the Cobb-Douglas technolocy) would not
completely specialize in manufacturing even at developed stages. In this case one could maintain the central argument
of the paper at the cost of exposition.
24This notation applies to all functions in what follows.
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This sector generates the manufactured good that can be consumed or stored. Let Kt and Ht be the
aggregate quantities of physical and human capital, respectively, employed by the manufacturing





t )1￿￿ = Mk￿
t HM
t ; (3)
where ￿ 2 (0;1), kt ￿ Kt=HM
t , and M > 0 denotes the level of technology.
As in the agricultural sector, producers in period t maximize their pro￿ts given wM
t , the market
wage per unit of human capital, and rt, the rental price per unit of physical capital in period t.




t = (1 ￿ ￿)Mk￿
t ￿ w(kt):
(4)
The rate of return on human capital, wM
t , increases with physical capital because of their comple-
mentarity in production.
3.1.3 Aggregate Output
The aggregate level of human capital at time t, Ht, is not less than the working population, which
is one for all t. Since there is no unemployment in the described circumstances,
Ht = HA
t + HM
t ￿ 1: (5)




t ) + MK￿
t (Ht ￿ HA
t )1￿￿; (6)




t . Noting the strict concavity of the production
functions, it follows that HA
t = argmaxyt.
Human capital moves to the sector o⁄ering a higher wage, and as long as both sectors are active,
the perfect mobility of human capital equalizes wA
t and wM
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the levels of kt and pt. Let pmin
t = pmin(kt) > 0 be the price level such that w(kt) = pmin
t FH(X;0)
for kt > 0. Then in light of (7),
HA
t = HA(kt;pt) for (kt;pt) ￿ 0; (8)
where HA(￿) = 0 for pt ￿ pmin
t , and HA(￿) > 0 with HA
k (￿) < 0 and HA
p (￿) > 0 for pt > pmin
t .
Moreover, limkt!0 HA(￿) = Ht and limkt!1 HA(￿) = 0:
3.2 Individuals
3.2.1 Environment
A new generation, consisting of a continuum of individuals, is born in the beginning of every period
and lives over the course of two periods. Hence there are two generations in society at each point
in time. The size of population is normalized to one. Individuals may di⁄er in their endowments,
yet they are homogeneous in all the other aspects. An individual born in period t is referred to as
a member i 2 [0;1] of generation t.
In the ￿rst period of life (youthhood), a member i of generation t has a single parent and
spends the entire time acquiring skills. The formation of human capital is augmented by investing
the manufactured good in education during this period. The education costs are ￿nanced from the
wealth transferred from her parent, bi




In the second period (adulthood), the individual has a single child and acquires human capital
hi
t+1 ￿ h(ei
t), where h(￿) is an increasing, strictly concave function satisfying the Inada conditions
and h(0) = 1. The last condition implies that no real expenditure on education results in labor
with basic skills. By supplying the human capital inelastically, the individual receives the wage
income wt+1hi
t+1, where wt+1 is the market wage rate in terms of the manufactured good at time
t + 1. On top of that, those who have savings or landownership respectively receive interest rates
or rents from producers. Unlike physical capital, there is no market for landownership: land is
under the ownership of old individuals and is inherited by their o⁄springs after every period. To






t) + ￿t+1xi; (9)
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EUI WP ECO 2005/3where Rt+1 ￿ 1+r(kt+1)￿￿ ￿ R(kt+1) and xi denotes the amount of land owned by the individual.
In order to simplify the analysis of the dynamical system, the complete capital depreciation, ￿ = 1;
is assumed in what follows.
3.2.2 Consumption
In this two-good world, the agricultural good is thought of as staple food essential for survival.
Suppose that food consumption is absolutely essential for adult individuals. More precisely, they
spend their incomes exclusively on the agricultural good up to a certain level, ^ c > 0, and the
demand for the agricultural good, which serves merely for survival, saturates at ^ c.25 The food







t+1 < pt+1^ c
c
A;i
t+1 = ^ c if Ii
t+1 ￿ pt+1^ c:
(10)
The remaining income is spent on cM
t+1, consumption of the manufactured good, and bt+1, the




t+1; with ￿ 2 (0;1); (11)
subject to cA
t+1 = ^ c and the budget constraint
pt+1cA
t+1 + cM
t+1 + bt+1 ￿ Ii
t+1: (12)





t+1) = ￿ max(Ii
t+1 ￿ pt+1^ c;0): (13)
Let vi
t be the indirect utility function of a member i of generation t in the absence of the food
constraint (i.e., Ii
t+1=pt+1 > ^ c). Then,
vi
t = ￿(Ii
t+1 ￿ pt+1^ c); with ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)1￿￿￿￿: (14)
25One may suppose that children consume a part of the food their parents purchase. For the sake of simplicity,
it is assumed that no one dies regardless of the amount of food consumption. Incorporating a death rate makes the
model more realistic, yet is not essential for this paper￿ s qualitative results.
26The qualitative results of the paper would be intact under a more realistic utility function (1￿￿1 ￿￿2)lnc
M
t+1 +
￿1 lnbt+1 + ￿2 ln(c
A
t+1 ￿ ^ c); provided that ￿2, the weight of excess food consumption, is su¢ ciently small.
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Each individual with perfect foresight invests in education and savings as a price taker. (10) and
(14) assert that regardless of the food constraint, the optimal investment is to maximize the second
period￿ s income Ii
t+1: Let et be the desirable level of education in period t for a given kt+1 > 0, in
the absence of borrowing constraints. It follows from (36) and (9) that
et = argmax
e
[w(kt+1)h(e) ￿ R(kt+1)e]: (15)
In view of the assumptions made on h(￿), there exists a single-valued function
et = e(kt+1) > 0 for kt+1 > 0; (16)
where e0(kt+1) > 0 with the Inada conditions.27 The intuition behind the positive reaction of
education to the capital ratio is straightforward: an increase in kt+1 raises the return on human
capital, wt+1, while reducing the return on savings, Rt+1. In order to simplify the analysis, it is
assumed that
e00(kt+1) ￿ 0; 8kt+1 > 0: (A1)
This condition depends on the third derivative as well as the ￿rst and second derivatives of h(￿).
In this economy, imperfections of the capital market eliminate any possibility for individuals
to make loans for education. Furthermore, they have no access to international capital markets.
Hence, while et is the ￿rst-best choice for all young members at time t, those facing the borrowing
constraint cannot achieve such a desirable level of education. A member i of generation t accordingly
























27One of the Inada conditions imposed on h(￿) eliminates the case that e(kt+1) = 0;9kt+1 > 0. As will become
clear, alternative speci￿cations of h(￿) would not alter the basic scenarios of the paper but complicate the exposition.
28The second case in (17) includes the possibility that kt+1 and thus et do not exist (i.e., Kt = H
M
t = 0). The
nonexistence of kt+1 means the complete specialization to agriculture in period t + 1, and thus all resources are
optimally used for skill acquisition in period t. Note also that kt+1 never becomes 0 because no workers engage in
the manufacturing sector that produces no output (recall that if Kt = 0, y
M












t ￿ et) + ￿t+1xi if bi
t ￿ et;
wt+1h(bi
t) + ￿t+1xi otherwise:
(19)
This result along with (13) suggests that the heterogeneity of bi
t+1 arises from those of bi
t and xi.
3.3 Initial Distribution of Wealth
In period 0, there are two income groups in society, R (Rich) and P (Poor), which respectively
comprise ￿xed fractions ￿ 2 (0;1=2) and 1 ￿ ￿ of population. The entire amounts of land and
capital in the economy are distributed evenly among the old members of group R; whereas those
of group P are proletarian.
The initial transfers depend on the initial levels and distributions of the three factors for pro-
duction. Assuming that K0 > 0 and hR
0 = hP
0 = 1, one can get
bR
0 = ￿ max[w0 + (￿0X + R0k0)=￿ ￿ p0^ c;0];
bP
0 = ￿ max(w0 ￿ p0^ c;0);
(20)
where ￿0X + R0k0 > 0. As shown below, the initial ranking of wealth among people does not
reverse in the future.












0 with equality only if bR
0 = bP
0 = 0. Hence the results
for period t ￿ 2 follow from (13) and (19). ￿
4 Short-Run Equilibrium
This section considers the determination of aggregate variables and transfers in each period.
4.1 Aggregate Capital and Output
In the absence of the opportunity for international lending and borrowing, the aggregate stock of
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Kt+1 = ￿sR
t + (1 ￿ ￿)sP
t =
8
> > > <
> > > :
Bt ￿ et if et ￿ bP
t < bR
t
Bt ￿ ￿et ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)bP
t if bP




where Bt ￿ ￿bR
t +(1￿￿)bP
t is the aggregate transfer allocated between investment in physical and
that in human capital. Note that group R￿ s savings are indispensable for the formation of physical
capital.
Human capital fully depreciates in one period since workers die o⁄. It thus follows from (17)
that the aggregate stock of human capital in period t + 1 is
Ht+1 = ￿h(eR
t ) + (1 ￿ ￿)h(eP
t ) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
h(et) if et ￿ bP
t < bR
t
￿h(et) + (1 ￿ ￿)h(bP
t ) if bP
t < et < bR
t
￿h(bR
t ) + (1 ￿ ￿)h(bP
t ) otherwise.
(22)
It thus follows from (5), (8) and (15) that the industrial capital-labor ratio is
kt+1 =
Bt ￿ ￿tet ￿ (1 ￿ ￿t)bP
t
￿th(et) + (1 ￿ ￿t)h(bP
t ) ￿ HA(kt+1;pt+1)
￿ q(kt+1;Bt;bP
t ;pt+1;￿t); (23)
where ￿t represents the fraction of young members who are not credit-constrained at time t:29 One
should note the independence of q(￿) from bP
t when ￿t is equal to one. The properties of h(￿), e(￿)
and HA(￿) ensure that kt+1 = q(kt+1;￿) holds in a perfect-foresight equilibrium. Hence there exists
a single-valued function implied by this condition,30
kt+1 = k(Bt;bP










29As noted in Footnote 28, if there is no physical capital in period t+1; then the physical-human capital ratio kt+1 is
unde￿ned. The existence of kt+1 therefore implies Kt+1 > 0; i.e., members of group R are never credit-constrained
and always have a positive amount of savings.
30The function k(Bt;b
P
t ;pt+1;￿t) is de￿ned on the set R++ ￿ [0;Bt] ￿ (0;p
max
t+1 ) ￿ (0;1]; where p
max
t+1 is de￿ned in
(67) in the Appendix. Although the function exists for pt+1>p
max
t+1 as well, the Appendix demonstrates that both
Kt+1 and H
M
t+1 are positive only for the aforementioned price range. In what follows, these four endogenous variables
are de￿ned on this set.
31e(k(￿;1)) = b
P
t if and only if e(k(￿;￿)) = b
P
t because q(￿;1) = q(￿;￿) for a value of kt+1 such that e(kt+1) = b
P
t :
Without loss of generality, one can choose ￿t = 1 if b
P
t = e(k(￿;1)) = e(k(￿;￿)) so that ￿t represents the fraction of
members who are not credit-constrained.
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limBt!0 k(Bt;0;￿) = 0; limBt!1 k(￿) = 1;
kB(￿) > 0; kb(￿) ￿ 0; kp(￿) ￿ 0;
(24)
where the second inequality holds strictly if and only if ￿t < 1; and the last inequality holds strictly
for pt+1 > pmin
t+1. The economic intuition behind the properties above deserves special emphasis.
First, kb(￿) is negative when members of group P are credit-constrained (i.e., ￿t = ￿), because they
invest only in human capital. Second, the positivity of kp(￿) re￿ ects the properties of HA(kt+1;pt+1)
in (8); a rise in the relative price of the agricultural good leads to a rise in wA
t+1, which attracts
more workers to the agricultural sector.
Figure 3 visualizes the determination of ￿t on the (Bt;bP
t ) space for a given price level p. The
Credit Constraint Frontier, the CC locus, is de￿ned as the set of all pairs (Bt;bP
t ) for which
bP
t = e(k(Bt;bP
t ;p;1)) = e(k(Bt;bP
t ;p;￿)):
The frontier converges to zero as Bt approaches zero, and its slope is between zero and one. Observe
that e(k(￿;1)) < bP
t on the region above the frontier and e(k(￿;￿)) > bP
t on the region below the
frontier￿ both cases are consistent with the de￿nition of ￿t.32
The equilibrium level of kt+1 is now expressed as a continuous single-valued function
kt+1 = ￿(Bt;bP
t ;pt+1); (25)
where pt+1 2 (0;pmax
t+1 ). Once the level of kt+1 is given, then Kt+1, Ht+1, the labor allocation
and the factor prices are all determined by individuals￿investment and the competitive market
mechanism.
In light of pmin
t de￿ned for (8) and the discussion in the Appendix, the patterns of specialization
are summarized as
yA
t = 0 and yM
t > 0 if pt 2 (0;pmin
t ];
yA
t > 0 and yM




t > 0 and yM
t = 0 if pt 2 [pmax
t ;1):
(26)
Substituting (21) and (22) into (6), aggregate output in period t + 1 is now expressed as
yt+1 = y(Bt;bP
t ;pt+1) = ￿IR
t+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)IP
t+1; (27)
32By contrast, e(k(￿;￿)) < b
P
t on the region above the frontier and e(k(￿;1)) > b
P
t on the region below the frontier￿
both cases are inconsistent with the de￿nition of ￿t:
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= 0 if pt+1 2 (0;pmax





where in particular, yB(￿) = Rt+1 when the manufacturing sector is active. Note that et =
argmaxyM
t+1. The last equality in (27) re￿ ects the linear homogeneity of the production functions.
The aggregate income is allocated entirely to old members, who are the owners of inputs.
4.2 The Goods￿Markets
4.2.1 The Open Economy
To the extent that the economy is open to the world markets, the domestic demand for each
commodity does not need to match the domestic supply, and the gap between them can be ￿lled by
either exports or imports. The payment of foreign trade always balances in the domestic economy.
4.2.2 The Closed Economy
The domestic demand for and supply of each good are equated when the economy is completely
closed to the world markets. In light of Walras￿law, one can focus on the agricultural good￿ s
market. As follows from (1), (7), (10) and (26), the clearance of the market at time t is achieved
by a pair (HA
t ;pt) such that
F(X;HA
t ) = ￿min(IR











There are two assumptions to be made for the economic environment in period 0. First, the
economy operates in a closed system where both sectors are active.33 The initial operation of
industry, which requires landowners who can a⁄ord transfers in period 0, ensures the transition
33This paper deals with only the case in which both sectors are active in autarkic equilibrium. Note that there is
a possibility that the autarkic economy does not produce the manufactured good. For example, it follows from (44)
below that y
M
0 = B0 = 0 if H
A
0 = 1 in (29). By contrast, agricultural output is always positive in the closed system,
because of the demand function (10) and a positive amount of land.
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group P. This initial inequality between two income classes would be historically plausible and
enables us to examine the e⁄ect of international trade on people in di⁄erent living standards.
Recalling that adult members of group P are endowed with nothing but basic skills in period 0,
one can ￿nd that IP
0 =p0 = FH(X;HA
0 ) from (7) and (19). Since they are facing the food constraint,
the initial employment level HA
0 satis￿es the ￿rst market-clearing condition of (28) in a way that
F(X;HA
0 ) = ￿^ c + (1 ￿ ￿)FH(X;HA
0 ) < ^ c; (29)
where HA
0 2 (0;1) is assumed in order to assure that both sectors operate in period 0.34










Since this means yM
0 > 0, (27) and (29) yield
IR
0 =p0 > [F(X;HA
0 ) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)FH(X;HA
0 )]=￿ = ^ c; (31)
consistent with the second initial condition.
Lemma 1 If (29) is satis￿ed, then for t ￿ 1; a pair Bt￿1 > bP
t￿1 = 0 leads to IP





Proof. See the Appendix. ￿
Let pc
t be the autarkic price at time t. Then, substituting HA
t+1 = HA
0 into (23) and then using
(28) produce pc
t+1 = pc(Bt) for Bt > 0 and bP






0 ; where kt+1 = ￿(Bt;0;pc
t+1): (32)
34The inequality in (29) holds for a su¢ ciently large ^ c since the equality implies that H
A
0 increases with ^ c. Also, the
neoclassical properties of F(￿) assure that H
A




F(X;1) > FH(X;1) = lim
￿!0
[(1 ￿ ￿)FH(X;1) + ￿^ c]:
More generally, H
A
0 could be larger than one, yet must be smaller than H0 = ￿h
R
0 + (1 ￿ ￿)h
P
0 .
35(32) is satis￿ed by a unique price level since H
A(￿(Bt;0;pt+1);pt+1) is strictly increasing in pt+1. Note that




Endogenous Globalization and Income Divergence 
EUI WP ECO 2005/35 Individuals￿Optimal Trade Policies
This section investigates the optimal prices from the viewpoint of each individual in society. Suppose
that the world economy is in a stationary state at a price level pw > 0. Then the feasible price
interval faced by all people is pt+1 2 [min(pw;pc
t+1);max(pw;pc
t+1)] ￿ pt+1, which ensures balanced
trade and the clearance of the domestic goods￿markets.










t+1=pt+1 ￿ ^ c; 8pt+1 2 pt+1;
argmax(Ii
t+1 ￿ pt+1^ c) otherwise,
(33)
where in view of (27), Ii
t+1 = Ii(Bt;bP
t ;pt+1) and thus vi
t = vi(Bt;bP
t ;pt+1):
In order to understand the discussion below, it is important to note that the e⁄ects of trade









5.1 The Landless Class
The optimal trade policy for the landless hinges on the e⁄ectiveness of the food and credit con-
straints, and there are three cases to be considered. First, as long as both constraints are binding
(IP
t+1 ￿ pt+1^ c and bP
t ￿ et for any pt+1 2 pt+1), they consume only the agricultural good and aim
to maximize the income in terms of the agricultural good, IP
t+1=pt+1 = FH(X;HA
t+1). Hence they
support the policy that promotes the specialization in manufacturing.
Secondly, when only the credit constraint is binding, members of group P consume both goods,
and their consumption level of the manufactured good depends on the income in terms of the
manufactured good, IP
t+1 = wt+1h(bP
t ). Compared to the ￿rst case above, they will be less sup-
portive of industrialization since the labor shift to the manufacturing sector reduces the industrial
capital-labor ratio kt+1, leading to a lower level of wt+1.
Lastly, when neither of the constraints is binding, members of group P receive transfers from
their parents and save part of them. While both goods are consumed as in the second case above,
36The ￿rst result follows from H
A
p (￿) + H
A
k (￿)￿p(￿) > 0. That is, although trade liberalization has a negative e⁄ect
on the agricultural employment via a decline in the capital ratio, this indirect e⁄ect is outweighed by the direct,
negative e⁄ect of the price change. The second result is implied by (21) and (24).
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t+1.
The negative e⁄ect of kt+1 on Rt+1 counteracts the positive e⁄ect of kt+1 on wt+1, and thereby
induces them to support a pro-industrial tari⁄ policy.
5.2 The Landed Class
This subsection considers only early development stages where Bt > bP
t = 0 and thus IP
t+1 = wt+1
as implied by (19). Since Lemma 1 has shown that in this situation, the food constraint is not
binding for landlords in autarky, one can use the second case of (33) with (27) to obtain
pR
t+1 = argmaxvR(Bt;0;pt+1)
= argmax[yt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)wt+1 ￿ ￿pt+1^ c]: (35)
Recall yp(￿) = yA





> > > <
> > > :
0 for pt 2 (0;pmin
t ];
￿tFH(X;HA
t ) for pt 2 (pmin
t ;pmax
t );
FH(X;Ht) for pt 2 [pmax
t ;1);
(36)
where ￿t 2 (0;1) is the point elasticity of wt with respect to pt.37
Lemma 2 If (A1); (29) and Bt > bP
t = 0 are satis￿ed, the desirable price for landlords of gener-
ation t; pR
t+1; is either pw (free trade) or pc
t+1 (autarky).
Proof. Since (1￿￿t) decreases with HA
t ; one can ￿nd from (29) and (34) that the objective function
in (35) is non-monotonically sloped and is strictly convex with respect to pt+1 2 (0;1), implying
the result. ￿
Next consider how landlords￿wealth level a⁄ects their choice between free trade and autarky.
In order to simplify the notation, let zc be variable z in autarky and zw be the one under free trade.
Recalling bP





t = vR(Bt;0;pw), and the analysis




t exhibit the properties as depicted in Figure 4. Observe
in the diagram that the landlords￿desired price depends on the level of aggregate transfer.
First we investigate the properties of v
R;c





t+1=￿ for Bt > 0: (37)
37The expression for ￿t is given by (68) in the Appendix. One can get ￿t+1 by applying the implicit function
theorem to (23) to get ￿p(￿) and to (7) to get H
A
p (￿), and also by noting h
0(et) = ￿=(1 ￿ ￿)kt+1 from (15).
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y
M;c
t+1 = M(Bt ￿ ￿et)￿[￿h(et) + 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ HA
0 ]1￿￿; (38)
which is a strictly increasing, strictly concave, continuous function of a single variable Bt, satisfying
the Inada conditions.38 Furthermore, y
M;c
t+1 diminishes towards zero as Bt approaches zero because,
as follows from (16) and (24), Kt+1 and Ht+1 respectively approach zero and one as Bt approaches
zero. Conversely, as Bt goes to in￿nity, Kt+1, Ht+1 and thus y
M;c
t+1 go to in￿nity. These properties
of y
M;c
t+1 are re￿ ected in those of v
R;c
t depicted in Figure 4.
Next consider the properties of v
R;w













t+1 ￿ ￿(Bt;0;pw): Noting et = argmaxyM
t+1; one can ￿nd that
for a given level of Bt; only the employment level in agriculture generates quantitative di⁄erences in
industrial outputs under di⁄erent trade policies.39 Let Bmin be a value of Bt such that pmax
t+1 = pw for
bP
t = 0. As shown in the Appendix, pmax
t+1 is an increasing function of Bt, meaning that pmax
t+1 < pw for
Bt 2 [0;Bmin] and pw < pmax
t+1 otherwise. It then follows from (26) that y
M;w
t+1 = 0 for Bt 2 [0;Bmin]
and y
M;w
t+1 > 0 for Bt > Bmin:













t+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)ww
t+1 ￿ ￿pw^ c]
o
=￿; (40)
where the ￿rst and second square brackets respectively indicate the gains from the industrial sector
and from the agricultural sector. Note that these two components are always opposite in their signs;
in the case of industrial (agricultural) specialization, the gain from industry is positive (negative),
whereas the gain from agriculture is negative (positive). This result re￿ ects a trade-o⁄ between
two assets￿ capital and land￿ in landlords￿portfolios.







t =@Bt > @v
R;w
t =@Bt for Bt = ￿ B; (41)
38These properties are obtained from (4), (15) and (24), noting @y
M
t+1=@Bt = R(kt+1) and et = argmaxy
M
t+1.




t can be ommitted to simplify the notation.
40The di⁄rence in @v
R




w)) = R(￿( ￿ B;0;p
c
t+1)). Second, the di⁄erence y
A
t+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)wt+1 decreases with Bt because, as follows
from (8), H
A
t+1 decreases with kt+1 and thus Bt:
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t+1 = pc(Bt) = pw. That is, landlords prefer autarky if
Bt is moderately greater than ￿ B: Recalling dpc(Bt)=dBt > 0 and pc(Bt) < pmax
t+1 for any Bt > 0;
pw < pc
t+1 < pmax
t+1 for Bt > ￿ B and bP
t = 0: (42)
Therefore, the economy has a comparative advantage (in period t+1) in manufacturing for Bt >
￿ B; and in agriculture for Bt < ￿ B. A higher level of aggregate transfer leads to a larger di⁄erence
between the domestic and world prices. If Bt is not su¢ ciently greater than ￿ B; specialization in
industry with insu¢ cient capital stocks does not bring them industrial pro￿ts enough to compensate
for their losses in agriculture. On the other hand, as asserted by the following lemma, su¢ cient
amounts of aggregate transfer induce landlords to vote for free trade.




> > > <
> > > :
< 0 for Bt 2 ( ￿ B; ~ B)
= 0 for Bt = ~ B
> 0 for Bt 2 ( ~ B;1):
Proof. See the Appendix. ￿
Group R￿ s trade-policy preferences are illustrated in Figure 4.41 As will become apparent in
Section 7, the diagram applies to the economy characterized by scarce land and a relatively large
fraction of landlords. ~ B is the value of Bt for which members of group R, the landed class, are
indi⁄erent between liberal and protective trade policies. They support anti-industrial protective
policies for Bt 2 ( ￿ B; ~ B); pro-industrial liberal policies for Bt > ~ B, and pro-agricultural liberal
policies for Bt < ￿ B.
6 Globalization and Economic Development
This section presents a non-monotonic evolution of trade policy that re￿ ects gradual changes in
individuals￿trade-policy preferences and the extension of the franchise. This section con￿nes its
analysis to a land-scarce economy, which can be viewed as Western Europe. It will demonstrate that
while the economy eventually liberalizes foreign trade, it may go through a stage of protectionism
between two surges of liberalism, depending on the scarcity of land. Namely, a bifurcation of
41 ￿ B > B








t+1 are increasing with Bt.
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land-abundant economies will be discussed in Section 7.
We postulate that in each period, the franchise is given only to young individuals who receive
transfers from their parents. They adopt a trade policy executed in the next period by majority
voting. Since group R is the minority (i.e., ￿ < 1=2), as long as bP
t > 0 the political decision fully

















As shown in (10) and (13), consumption and transfers depend on the income and price levels.
Hence in light of (27) and (43), the evolution of the economy is governed by a two-dimensional,
￿rst-order, autonomous dynamical system in Bt and bP
t :
Bt+1 = ￿(yt+1 ￿ pt+1CA
t+1) = ￿(Bt;bP




t+1 = ￿ max(IP
t+1 ￿ pt+1^ c;0) =  (Bt;bP





t + (1 ￿ ￿)c
A;P
t denotes the aggregate food consumption at time t.
In order to exclude development scenarios that are beyond this paper￿ s scope, it is assumed
that
B0 2 ( ￿ B; ~ B); bP
0 = 0; p0 = pc
0; (A2)
where B0 = ￿MK￿
0 (1￿HA
0 )1￿￿ > 0 as follows from (29) and (44). The ￿rst condition above leads
to both comparative advantage in manufacturing and landlords￿preference of autarky over free
trade in period 1. The second and third conditions imply that (29) is satis￿ed.
Let ^ B be the critical value for which unskilled proletarians can a⁄ord just the food consumption
level ^ c under free trade. Namely,42
w(^ k) = pw^ c; where ^ k ￿ ￿( ^ B;0;pw): (45)
Let B0 be a value such that pc
t+1 > pw for all Bt > B0 and bP
t 2 [0;Bt):43 The analysis in what
follows is limited to the case
max(B0; ~ B) < ^ B: (A3)
42The properties of ￿(￿) in (24) ensure that ^ B is uniquely de￿ned.
43Noting B
￿ de￿ned below, B




EUI WP ECO 2005/3Consistent with the historical evidence, the condition B0 < ^ B keeps the economy￿ s comparative
advantage in manufacturing over time, and the condition ~ B < ^ B makes the food constraint binding
for group P in the ￿rst period of trade liberalization.44
Figure 3 depicts the conditional dynamical system formed by Bt+1 = ￿(Bt;bP
t ;pw) and bP
t+1 =
 (Bt;bP
t ;pw) on the (Bt;bP
t ) space de￿ned as R++￿[0;Bt). Given the ￿xed world price, Bt+1 = Bt
and bP
t+1 = bP
t along the BB locus and the bb locus, respectively. Given the initial condition above,
the pair (Bt;bP
t ) never enters the region above the 45￿ line, as was established in Corollary 1.
6.1 Stage I - Dominance of the Landed Class and Resistance to Free Trade
The economy develops in Stage I at time t 2 [0;~ t], where ~ t is the period such that Bt ￿ ~ B for all
t < ~ t and Bt > ~ B for t = ~ t. Note that (A2) implies ~ t > 0: In this early stage of development, the
food constraint is binding for members of group P and political power is in the hands of the landed
interest, who resist trade liberalization.
6.1.1 The Evolution of the Economy
The initial pair of transfers is B0 2 ( ￿ B; ~ B) and bP




t+1 for Bt 2 [ ￿ B; ~ B] and bP
t = 0;
assuming that landowners vote for a protective policy when they are indi⁄erent. It thus follows






t+1 =  (Bt;0;pc
t+1) = ￿ max(wt+1 ￿ pc
t+1^ c;0) = 0;
(46)
where the last equality on the ￿rst line is based on (37).45 The properties of vR(Bt;0;pc
t+1) are
explained in Subsection 5.2 and are depicted in Figure 4.
Let B￿ be a value of Bt for which pwFH(X;0) = w(kt+1) or equivalently pmin(kt+1) = pw;
where kt+1 = k(Bt;bP
t ;pw;1).46 It follows from (24) and (26) and that pmin
t+1 > pw for Bt > B￿ and
44The feasibility of the condition (A3) can be proven as follows. Consider the case in which ~ c goes to in￿nity and
￿ approaches 1, while (1￿￿)=p
w remains constant. First, in light of (45), ^ B becomes in￿nitely large. Second, noting
that B
￿ remains ￿nite, one can ￿nd a value of B
0 which is smaller than ^ B. Third and ￿nally, noting that opening
up to international trade raises the capital labor ratio kt+1; one can ￿nd from (40) and (41) that ~ B ! ￿ B; whereas ￿ B
remains constant because of (28) and p




t+1 in (37) is denoted as y
M
t+1 in this section to simplify the notation.
46B
￿ is independent of b
P
t because (24) shows that b
P




￿ is independent of
X because FH(X;0) = (1 ￿ a)
1=￿:
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t 2 [0;Bt); meaning complete specialization in manufacturing under free trade.
In order to assure that the economy goes through all phases of globalization, the technological
level of manufacturing, M, is assumed to be high enough to satisfy
Bt < ￿￿M(Bt ￿ ￿et)￿[￿h(et) + 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ HA
0 ]1￿￿ for Bt = ^ B;B￿; (A4)
where on the right-hand side is ￿ times the rental income on capital Rt+1Kt+1 that would be if the
dynamical system (46) operated for Bt = ^ B;B￿ and bP
t = 0:47
Given the properties of vR(Bt;0;pc
t+1); the condition above leads to
Bt < ￿(Bt;0;pc
t+1) for 0 < Bt ￿ max( ^ B;B￿): (47)
It follows that Bt+1 > Bt in the time interval [0;~ t] and the economy eventually departs from Stage




t and yt+1 > yt for t 2 [0;~ t].
6.1.2 Class Con￿ ict
The above analysis and (42) lead to
pt = pR
t = pc




0 < ^ c; bP




0 ): Note that the food constraint is binding for members of group P:
The two groups have con￿ icting viewpoints regarding the trade policy in Stage I. Trade liberal-
ization is bene￿cial for members of group P, whose incomes are entirely devoted to the agricultural
consumption. A decline in the price from the autarkic level leads to a decline in the agricultural
employment and an increase in the wage in terms of the agricultural good, FH(X;HA
t ). However,
the franchise is not given to group P in this immature development stage and their agricultural
consumption is suppressed at the autarkic price level. Proposition 1 summarizes the discussion.
Proposition 1 Under (A1)-(A4); pt = pR
t = pc
t > pw = pP
t in the time interval [0;~ t].
6.2 Stage II - The First Globalization
The economy develops in Stage II for period t 2 (~ t;^ t], where ^ t is the period such that Bt ￿ ^ B for
all t < ^ t and Bt > ^ B for t = ^ t. As in Stage I, the subsistence constraint is binding for members of
47The condition (A4) holds given a su¢ ciently high level of M; noting that both ^ B and B




EUI WP ECO 2005/3group P and the political system is dominated by the landed class. Unlike in Stage I, however, trade
liberalization brings about an increase in the labor employment and output of the manufacturing
sector enough to alter landlords￿attitudes towards trade policies. The economy accordingly opens
up to international trade.
6.2.1 The Evolution of the Economy
In the ￿rst period of Stage II, B~ t 2 ( ~ B; ^ B] by de￿nition and bP
~ t = 0 from (48). In view of Lemmas
2-3 and (43),
pt+1 = pR
t+1 = pw for Bt 2 ( ~ B; ^ B] and bP
t = 0:
For this set of transfers, IP
t+1 = wt+1 ￿ pw^ c by noting (19) and the de￿nition of ^ B. Thus in
light of (14) and (27), (44) becomes
Bt+1 = ￿(Bt;0;pw) = ￿￿vR(Bt;0;pw)=￿;
bP
t+1 =  (Bt;0;pw) = ￿ max(wt+1 ￿ pw^ c;0) = 0:
(49)
The properties of vR(Bt;0;pw) are illustrated in Figure 4. vR(Bt;0;pw) is greater than vR(Bt;0;pc
t+1)
for Bt > ~ B, implying a higher path of Bt under free trade than in autarky. This means that, re-
calling (47),
Bt < ￿(Bt;0;pw) for ~ B ￿ Bt ￿ max( ^ B;B￿): (50)
Since vR(Bt;0;pw) is increasing in Bt; it follows that Bt+1 > Bt for t 2 [~ t;^ t] and Bt exceeds ^ B
within ￿nite time. As depicted in Figure 3, the pair (Bt;bP
t ) moves rightwards on the interval
( ~ B; ^ B] of the horizontal axis￿ a portion of the bb locus￿ in Stage II.
As Bt and thus kt+1 are rising over time, the employment of human capital is increasing in the





t and yt+1 > yt for t 2 (~ t;^ t].
6.2.2 Class Con￿ ict
The above analysis and (42) lead to
pt = pR










t ): Note that the food constraint is still binding for group P:
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franchise is still limited to group R: Due to the di⁄erence between the world-market and autarkic
prices, opening up to international trade decreases the employment in agriculture and thereby
breaks the agrarian equilibrium (29), in which the living standard of the masses is suppressed. The
resultant improvement in FH(￿); the wage in terms of food, enhances group P￿ s food consumption.
For this reason, a liberal policy is desirable for group P as well as for group R. Proposition 2
summarizes the discussion.
Proposition 2 Under (A1)-(A4); pt = pw = pP
t = pR
t in the time interval (~ t;^ t].
The monotonic growth of c
A;P
t in (51) is driven by the accumulation of aggregate transfer, which
enhances the capital-labor ratio in industry and thereby decreases the labor employment of the
agricultural sector. Through this process the wage rage FH(￿) exceeds the subsistence consumption
level ^ c in period ^ t + 1.
6.3 Stage III - The Rise of the Working Class and Political Backlash
The economy develops in Stage III for period t 2 (^ t;t￿), where t￿ is the period such that under free
trade, bP
t < et for all t < t￿ and bP
t ￿ et for t = t￿. Noting kp(￿) ￿ 0 in (24), the credit constraint
remains binding on group P for any feasible price pt+1 2 [pw;pc
t+1]: On the other hand, unlike in
the previous stages the food constraint is no longer binding, the franchise is given to all adults in
society, and the landless workers invest in education. However, their wealth levels are still too low
to nullify the credit constraint and to invest in physical capital. The increasing demand for the
manufactured good may prompt the mass to be protectionist against the in￿ ow of staple food.
It follows from (50) and (51) that in the ￿rst period of Stage III, ^ t + 1;
B^ t+1 > ^ B; bP
^ t+1 > 0; and p^ t+1 = pR
^ t+1 = pw: (52)
6.3.1 Conditional Dynamics
In order to facilitate the analysis of unconditional dynamics, ￿rst consider the evolution of the
economy conditional on pt+1 = pw for all t > ^ t. The lemma below asserts that there is no bb locus
and bP
t grows monotonically on the subspace [ ^ B; ￿ B] ￿ [0;Bt) in Figure 3. A level of aggregate
transfer ￿ B in the lemma will be speci￿ed later.
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t ;pw) ￿ bP
t for Bt 2 [ ^ B; ￿ B] and bP
t 2 [0;Bt); with equality
only for Bt = ^ B and bP
t = 0:
Proof. See the Appendix ￿
Hence, for Bt 2 [ ^ B; ￿ B] and bP
t 2 [0;et), all members of generation t consume ^ c units of food
whereas the credit constraint is binding for group P.48 In this case ￿t = ￿ and the evolution of
aggregate transfer in (44) becomes
Bt+1 = ￿(Bt;bP
t ;pw) = ￿(yt+1 ￿ pw^ c); (53)
where in view of (27),
￿B(￿) = ￿Rt+1 > 0; ￿BB(￿) < 0; ￿b(￿) > 0; (54)
Figure 3 geometrically represents the conditional dynamical system in the subspace where Bt 2
[ ^ B; ￿ B] and bP
t 2 [0;et). One can ￿nd from (50) and (54) that
￿( ^ B;bP
t ;pw) > ^ B for bP
t 2 [0;et): (55)
Given these properties of ￿(￿) and the initial condition (52), the aggregate transfer increases
monotonically over time towards the positively sloped BB locus, along which Bt 2 ( ^ B; ￿ B). It
thus follows from Lemma 4 that bP
t also increases monotonically over time, eventually exceeding
et(< Bt).
6.3.2 Unconditional Dynamics
The nature of the unconditional dynamics depends on the price level determined in accordance
with (43). Recalling (27),
pw = argmax[y(Bt;bP
t ;pt+1) ￿ pt+1^ c]; (56)
where pt+1 2 [pw;pc
t+1]: It follows from (44) that a liberal policy maximizes aggregate transfer in
the absence of the food constraint.
Lemma 5 If (A1)-(A4) are satis￿ed and X is su¢ ciently small, then
0 < bP
t < bP
t+1 < ￿ bP and ^ B < Bt+1 < ￿ B for t 2 (^ t;t￿):





w^ c in this case. Hence C
A
t+1 = ^ c. As follows from (A3),
if Bt is greater than ^ B; the manufacturing sector operates and Kt+1 > 0. A positive amount of capital requires that
members R of generation t are not credit-constrained.
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and (43) with (19) and Lemma 4, one can obtain
pt+1 = pP
t+1 = argmax[wt+1h(bP
t ) ￿ pt+1^ c]; (57)
implying that pt+1 = argmax (￿). If pt+1 is su¢ ciently close to pw; one can apply (55) to show
that ￿( ^ B;bP
t ;pt+1) > ^ B for bP
t < ^ B. In this case ^ B < Bt+1 < ￿ B, where the second inequality is
implied by (56). Such a low price level is chosen by group P because HA
t+1 ! 0 and ￿t+1 ! 0 in
(36) as X ! 0 for a given triplet (Bt;bP
t ;pt+1): Therefore, it follows from Lemma 4 that as in the
conditional dynamics, bP
t grows monotonically over time and ultimately exceeds et. ￿
As shown in (57), the desirable price for members of group P maximizes [wt+1h(bP
t ) ￿ pt+1^ c].
Note that the objective function includes the wage in terms of the manufactured good, wt+1;
because members of group P consume the manufactured good as well as the agricultural good.
Raising the relative price promotes intersectoral labor shifts from industry to agriculture, and
accordingly increases kt+1 and wt+1. For this reason, free trade is not necessarily most desirable
for them: As shown above, the desirable price for group P depends on the level of ￿t+1.
Proposition 3 If (A1)-(A4) are satis￿ed, moderatelyland-scarce economies are likely to experience
political backlash against liberalism in Stage III, where severelyland-scarce economies will maintain
liberalism.
Proof. (68) in the Appendix reveals that for a given triplet (Bt;bP
t ;pw); ￿t+1 increases with X
because HA
t+1;X=HA
t+1 and kt+1 increase with X whereas HM
t+1 decreases with X: In addition, ￿t+1
can be su¢ ciently close to 1 depending on the structural parameter; e.g., ￿t+1 ! 1 as a ! 0: Hence
the results follow from the proof of Lemma 5, noting that an excessively land-abundant economy
becomes too protectionist to depart from Stage III. ￿
The mechanism behind the resurgence of protectionism can be explained in the following man-
ner. Given a larger amount of land, a change in the relative price has a bigger impact on the wage
in terms of the manufactured good, wt; because both ￿t and FH(￿) increase with X. Under this
circumstance, workers ￿nd optimal to balance the consumption of these two goods by a centrist
policy, rather than to maximize only food consumption by an extremely liberal policy.
The proposition above asserts a possibility of a bifurcation of trade policy among land-scarce
economies in Stage III. Severe political backlash will retard the accumulation of aggregate transfer,
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the economy back to the previous stages. In order to assure the economy￿ s departure from Stage
III, agricultural land is assumed to be su¢ ciently small.
The evolution of aggregate output depends on the executed trade policy. As shown in the
analysis of the conditional dynamics, a liberal policy will continue to raise aggregate transfers
and hence aggregate output. On the other hand, a protectionist policy does not guarantee their
monotonic growth.
6.3.3 Class Con￿ ict
It will be shown that the protectionist policy adopted by moderately land-scarce economies causes
class con￿ icts between growing workers and landowners, who can be regarded as big capitalists in
this stage.
Lemma 6 If (A1)-(A4) are satis￿ed and pP
t+1 > pw in period t 2 (^ t;t￿); then pR
t+1 = pw in the
period.
Proof. Follows from Corollary 1 and (57). pi
t+1 = argmax(Ii
t+1 ￿ pt+1^ c) in period t 2 (^ t;t￿): Note
that pw 6= pP
t+1 whereas pw = argmax(yt+1 ￿ pt+1^ c) from (56). The result therefore follows from
and (27). ￿
Hence, the two groups never agree on protectionist policies in Stage III.
Proposition 4 If (A1)-(A4) are satis￿ed, then moderately land-scarce economies are likely to have
pt+1 = pP
t+1 > pR
t+1 = pw in the time interval (^ t;t￿):
Proof. Follows from Proposition 3 and Lemma 6. ￿
It deserves special emphasis that political backlash to protectionism in Stage III is supported
not by capitalists but by workers, who are better o⁄.49
6.4 Stage IV - The Second Globalization
The economy develops in Stage IV for period t ￿ t￿. The food constraint is not binding as in
Stage III, and moreover, the credit constraint dissipates in the long run. In the absence of the two
49While landowners are homogeneous in this model, it is plausible to consider that in reality, protective policy
was suppoted by large-size landlords, whose landownership is their dominant income source. As shown in (52), the
￿rst period of Stage III, t + 1, is a transitionary period in which the ongoing trade policy was determined by adult
members of group R, while young members of group P has obtained voting rights for the next periods￿trade policy.
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on capital. The positive e⁄ect of trade liberalization on the interest rate will outweigh its negative
e⁄ect on the wage rate at highly developed stages, swaying countries towards liberalism.
It follows from Lemma 5 with (52) and (A3) that in the ￿rst period of Stage IV, t￿;
Bt￿ > ^ B; bP
t￿ ￿ et￿; and pt￿ 2 [pw;pc
t￿]: (58)
6.4.1 Conditional Dynamics
In order to facilitate the analysis of the dynamical system, ￿rst consider the evolution of transfers
conditional on pt+1 = pw for t ￿ t￿. It follows from Corollary 1 and Lemma 4 that for Bt 2 [ ^ B; ￿ B]
and bP
t ￿ et, no constraint is binding and ￿t = 1: In this case (44) becomes
Bt+1 = ￿(Bt;bP
t ;pw) = ￿(yt+1 ￿ pw^ c);
bP
t+1 =  (Bt;bP
t ;pw) = ￿(IP
t+1 ￿ pw^ c);
(59)
where in view of (27) and (19),
￿B(￿) = ￿Rt+1 > 0; ￿BB(￿) < 0; ￿b(￿) = 0; lim
Bt!1
￿B(￿) = 0; (60)
 B(￿) > 0;  b(￿) = ￿Rt+1 > 0;  bb(￿) = 0: (61)
Note that the interest rate Rt+1 is the additional factor through which trade policies a⁄ect IP
t+1:
The lemma below re￿ ects valueless landownership and the associated dissipation of wealth
inequality under complete specialization in manufacturing.
Lemma 7 If (A1)-(A4) are satis￿ed, the conditional dynamical system (59) has a unique, non-
trivial steady-state equilibrium ( ￿ B;￿ bP) such that
￿ B = ￿( ￿ B;￿ bP;pw) = ￿ bP =  ( ￿ B;￿ bP;pw) > max( ^ B;B￿):
Proof. Suppose bP
t ￿ et. Then (A4) and (60) yield a unique steady-state aggregate transfer
￿ B = ￿( ￿ B;bP
t ;pw) > max( ^ B;B￿). Since ￿ B and the associated capital-labor ratio ￿ k = k( ￿ B;bP
t ;pw;1)
are independent of bP
t , (60)-(61) yield
￿B( ￿ B;bP
t ;pw) =  b( ￿ B;bP
t ;pw) = ￿R(￿ k) < 1; (62)
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agricultural output is zero and aggregate output is w(￿ k)h(e(￿ k)) + R(￿ k)[ ￿ B ￿ e(￿ k)]. Hence noting
(59), one can ￿nd that ￿ B = ￿ bP > e(￿ k), establishing the lemma. ￿
Figure 3 geometrically represents the conditional dynamical system (59) in the subspace where
Bt 2 [ ^ B; ￿ B] and bP
t 2 [et;Bt). This is the region where neither food nor credit constraints are
binding. The upper bb locus in the diagram is negatively sloped and has a unique intersection with
the 45￿ line at point ( ￿ B;￿ bP).50 One can ￿nd from (55) and (60) that
￿( ^ B;bP
t ;pw) > ^ B for bP
t 2 [et;Bt): (63)
This implies that given the initial condition (58), aggregate transfer Bt increases monotonically over
time towards the vertical BB locus. It thus follows from Lemma 4 that bP
t also increases monoton-
ically over time. As follows from (62), the pair (Bt;bP
t ) converges to a steady-state equilibrium
( ￿ B;￿ bP):51 Throughout Stage IV, yt, yM
t and kt monotonically increase whereas yA
t monotonically
decreases and reaches zero in the long run.
6.4.2 Unconditional Dynamics
As in Stage III, the nature of the unconditional dynamics depends on the price level determined
by (43). A protective trade policy retards industrialization, although it may pro￿t some members
in society.
Lemma 8 If (A1)-(A4) are satis￿ed and X is su¢ ciently small, then
0 < bP
t < bP
t+1 < ￿ bP and ^ B < Bt+1 < ￿ B for t ￿ t￿;
and bP
t ! Bt as t ! 1:





t+1 + (Bt ￿ bP
t )=kt+1]; (64)
where the amount in the square bracket is smaller than h(et). Then noting (63), the result can be
proven in the same way as the one for Lemma 5. ￿
50Appying the implicit function theorem to (59), one can ￿nd that the bb locus is negatively sloped over the range
of Bt where ￿R(k(Bt;b
P
t ;p
w;1)) < 1. Note that ￿R(￿ k) < 1, as shown in the proof of Lemma 7.
51Although b
P
t may temporarily become smaller than et in a period t > t
￿; Lemma 4 and the fact Bt 2 (et; ￿ B)
assure that b
P
t > et in the long run.
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t negatively correlates with a member R￿ s capital income Rt+1sP
t : Hence,
when the di⁄erence is su¢ ciently small, a rise in pt+1 raises the capital-labor ratio kt+1 and thereby
decreases her capital income, o⁄setting its positive e⁄ect on the wage rate (i.e., @IP
t+1=@pt+1 in (64)
becomes small). In this circumstance, group P is likely to support a liberal policy.
Proposition 5 If (A1)-(A4) are satis￿ed and X is su¢ ciently small, the economy converges to a
steady-state equilibrium ( ￿ B;￿ bP;pw):
Proof. Note that FH(X;HA
t+1)HA
t+1 < ^ c in (64) due to the specialization in manufacturing and
the linear homogeneity of the production function (1). Moreover, (23) implies that if Bt ￿ bP
t is
su¢ ciently small, then bP
t > et and ￿t = 1. It thus follows from Lemma 8 that bP
t > et and
pt+1 = pP
t+1 = pw in the long run. The unconditional dynamical system then becomes equivalent
to the conditional dynamical system, establishing the result. ￿
Hence, despite the possibility of temporary political backlash, the economy will liberalize foreign
trade in the long run. The eventual return to liberalism should be interpreted as a prediction
of the trade policy in unreached, highly-developed stages, due to the fact that most currently
developed countries still protect agriculture. After the permanent trade liberalization, yt, yM
t and
kt monotonically increase as in the case of conditional dynamics.
Proposition 6 Under (A1)-(A4), the triplet ( ￿ B;￿ bP;pw) maximizes long-run industrial output.
Proof. As shown earlier, free trade maximizes aggregate transfer and there is no steady state in
Stage II. Hence, noting yB(￿) > 0 in (27), there is no food constraint in the long-run when industrial
output is maximized. Then one can use (56) to show that pw = argmax￿(Bt;bP
t ;pt+1). In addition,
(44) yields ￿b(￿) ￿ 0 with equality only if bP
t ￿ et: Hence the pair (￿ bP;pw) generates the maximized
level of long-run aggregate transfer, which is ￿ B: Finally, ￿ B maximizes industrial output because of
￿ B > B￿: ￿
This proposition and the analysis of Stages II-IV reveal that a permanent free-trade policy after
Stage I results in maximizing long-run industrial output. Note that trade liberalization in Stage
I may prevent economic take-o⁄ and hence industrialization. Such a hasty reform may discourage
the accumulation of physical and human capital by reducing the incomes of landlords, who own
the entire assets in Stage I.
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Proof. The ￿rst two equalities are shown in the proof of Lemma 5. Around the steady-state
equilibrium ( ￿ B;￿ bP;pw); agricultural output is zero and thus IR
t+1=@pt+1 is obtained from (64) by
replacing bP
t with bR
t : The result therefore follows from Lemma 5. ￿
Hence, all members will ultimately agree on a free-trade policy in this land-scarce economy.
7 Divergence
This section discusses the role of the landed class in early take-o⁄ in economic development. For
this purpose, consider two countries, A and B:
￿ Country A is the one considered in Section 6, satisfying (A1)-(A4):
￿ Country B is identical to Country A except that the former has a larger amount of land per
landlord, xR.
Lemma 9 (a) If X is su¢ ciently large, Bt > ￿(Bt;0;pc
t+1) for Bt = ~ B:
(b) ~ B decreases with the fraction of landlords, ￿:
Proof. (a) Recalling that pc( ￿ B) = pw; where pc(￿) is de￿ned in relation to (32), one can ￿nd that
pwFH(X;HA
0 ) = w(￿( ￿ B;0;pw)): It then follows from (2), (4) and (24) that ￿ B ! 1 as X ! 1: On
the other hand, (38) and (46) reveal that as X ! 1; ￿(Bt;0;pc
t+1) remains ￿nite for any Bt > 0:
Hence the result follows from the fact ￿ B < ~ B and the Inada condition of ￿(Bt;0;pc
t+1):
(b) The result follows from (40), noting that @v
R;c
t =@Bt < @v
R;w
t =@Bt forBt = ~ B: ￿
Hence, su¢ ciently large values of xR prevent the economic take-o⁄ in Stage II.
Proposition 8 (Income Divergence) (a) Country A turns to pro-industrial a free trade policy
in Stage II. The resulting decline in the food price promotes widespread investment, leading
the country to Stage IV.
(b) Country B tends to stagnate in Stage I, where an anti-industrial, protectionist policy is
adopted.
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(A4), there exists a value Bt 2 ( ￿ B; ~ B) such that Bt = ￿(Bt;0;pw) if ￿ is smaller and X is not
excessively larger than those of Country A. Hence the economy remains in Stage I and the result
follows. ￿
In Country A, a pro-industrial free trade policy in Stage II reduces the food price and thereby
improves the living standards of the masses. The resulting widespread investment enables a depar-
ture from stagnation in which a large part of labor is required for food production. Such free-trade
trade policy is supported by the landed class, who have a relatively weak incentive to protect
agriculture due to their small gains from landownership.
In Country B, by contrast, land rents are the major source of landowners￿ incomes and a
substantial amount of capital is necessary for them to support a pro-industrial, anti-agricultural
policy. Hence, large-size landlords will stick to agricultural protection. Such an anti-industrial
policy impedes the food-price reduction and thereby discourages productive activities by the mass.
The economy will accordingly stagnate in underdeveloped stages.52
8 Concluding Remarks
This article has developed a theoretical framework for understanding the evolution of trade policy,
underlying internal class con￿ icts, and global income divergence over the last few centuries. It
analyzes the dynamic interaction between trade policy and economic development, and thereby
bridges a gap between two strands of literature￿ open-economy growth theories and endogenous
tari⁄ theories. On the one hand, trade-policy preferences and the executed trade policy depend on
the stage of development. Due to the distributional e⁄ects of trade liberalization, income sources
as well as income levels characterize individuals￿attitudes towards trade policy, and these two
elements vary in the process of development. On the other hand, engaging in international trade
a⁄ects aggregate output, income distribution and private investment through specialization in a
sector with a comparative advantage. The central argument of this paper is that this mutual
dependence between trade policy and development has been one of the principal forces operating
behind the evolution of the world economy, particularly since the mid-19th century, when European
52If X is excessively large, the economy will converge to a steady-state equilibrium where it has a comparative
advantage in agriculture. This paper does not go into this case, though.
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development in part depends on the relative size of land in landowners￿portfolios.
A large portion of the article dwells on 19th-century Western Europe, which had a comparative
advantage in manufacturing in global markets and pulled ahead of the other nations by trade
expansion. Consistent with this historical experience, the proposed theory argues that capital-
abundant, land-scarce (i.e., Western European) economies undergo a non-monotonic evolution of
trade policy in the growth process.
The ￿rst wave of liberalism is triggered by a shift in landlords￿stance towards liberalism, a shift
associated with the increasing importance of industrial capital in their portfolios. Specialization
in manufacturing after trade liberalization fuels aggregate output by releasing the economy from
resource constraints. In addition, the landless poor bene￿t from trade which provides them with
inexpensive staple food.
The subsequent political backlash results from improved living standards and the accompanying
political participation of the middle class, who care about the purchasing power of capital-intensive
goods as well as that of land-intensive goods. The retreat into protectionism is, however, not a
universal phenomenon and a bifurcation of trade policy is observed in this intermediate development
stage. It is demonstrated that the political backlash will occur in moderately land-scarce countries
with, such as France and Germany, but not in severely land-scarce countries, such as Great Britain.
On top of that, the surge of protectionism will not bring the economy back to previous stages as
long as the amount of land is relatively small. These asymmetric results regarding trade protection
apply to the case of Western Europe in the late 19th century.
Further specialization in manufacturing in later stages shrinks domestic agriculture and accord-
ingly all individuals, regardless of their landownership, are inclined to support pro-industrial, liberal
policies. The developed theory therefore predicts the dissipation of class con￿ icts over trade policy.
Land-scarce countries accordingly reach a developed stage with free trade despite the possibility of
their temporary retreat to protectionism.
Contrary to the above-mentioned scenario, countries with large-scale landlords are likely to
remain protectionist￿ an outcome that leads to global income divergence. The relative importance
of land is typically dominant in their portfolios, and in order to secure this principal income source,
those landed interests have a strong incentive to oppose a pro-industrial policy. Such negative
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this circumstances, the masses need to spend most of their incomes on the consumption of staple
foods, leaving no resources for productive activities.
While this article has taken a novel approach to analyzing the potential relationship between
trade policy and economic development, it omits several aspects relevant to the world economy
during the period under consideration. First, the developed model abstracts from technological
progress, in particular improvements in transportation productivity, which has promoted the inte-
gration of global markets. Second, the paper has con￿ned its assessment to the direct, quantitative
impacts of trade in commodities on trading economies. As argued by Irwin (2001, 3), however, one
should also pay attention to several Asian commodities that were traded in small quantities, as they
may have conveyed embodied new technology to Europe. Third, it will be desirable to consider
political games between trading countries who strategically adopt their trade policies. Altering
the small-open economy assumption enables to take into account the home country￿ s reaction to
foreign countries￿trade policies. Finally, this paper has considered the economy producing a single
manufactured good, and hence unable to analyze the protection for manufacturing sectors. Al-
though its focus on agricultural protection is a reasonable simpli￿cation to study European trade
policy before the 20th century, it would be less appropriate for contemporary debates; nowadays
the protection of domestic industry would have greater impacts on advanced economies than that
of agricultural goods would. Future research should be directed to addressing these issues.
Appendix
Patterns of Specialization
If the production of the manufactured good takes place at time t+1, both numerator and denom-
inator of q(￿) must be positive. To check this condition, ￿rst de￿ne a level of kt+1, kd
t+1, for which
the denominator of q(￿) is zero. Then, 8(bP
t ;pt+1;￿t) 2 R+ ￿ R++ ￿ (0;1];
￿th(e(kt+1)) + (1 ￿ ￿t)h(bP
t ) ￿ HA(kt+1;pt+1)
8
> > > <
> > > :
< 0 for kt+1 2 (0;kd
t+1);
= 0 for kt+1 = kd
t+1;
> 0 for kt+1 > kd
t+1:
(65)
The existence of kd




p(￿) > 0. Second, let kn
t+1 be a value of kt+1 for which the numerator of q(￿) is zero. Then
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Bt ￿ ￿te(kt+1) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿t)bP
t
8
> > > <
> > > :
> 0 for kt+1 2 (0;kn
t+1);
= 0 for kt+1 = kn
t+1;
< 0 for kt+1 > kn
t+1:
(66)
It follows from e0(kt+1) > 0 that kn
t+1 = kn(Bt;bP
t ;￿t).
Given these results, one can de￿ne pmax




t+1 ;￿t) = kn(Bt;bP
t ;￿t); (67)
where (Bt;bP
t ;￿t) 2 R++ ￿ R+ ￿ (0;1]. This relationship yields a single-valued function pmax
t+1 =
pmax(Bt;bP
t ;￿t) on the set. The patterns of specialization depend on the relationship between pt+1
and pmax
t+1 . Consider the following two possible cases for a given triplet (Bt;bP
t ;￿t) on the domain
above:
Case I: 0 < pt+1 < pmax
t+1 . Recalling @kd
t+1=@pt+1 > 0 and (67), one can ￿nd 0 < kd
t+1 < kn
t+1.
As follows from (65) and (66) that, for kt+1 2 (kd
t+1;kn
t+1); (i) both numerator and denominator
of q(￿) are positive, and (ii) q(￿) is decreasing in kt+1. On the other hand, q(￿) < 0 for kt+1 2
R++n[kd
t+1;kn
t+1]. These properties guarantee the existence of a unique value kt+1 2 (kd
t+1;kn
t+1)
satisfying (23). Members of group R are not credit-constrained in period t:
Case II: pmax
t+1 ￿ pt+1. It follows that 0 < kn
t+1 ￿ kd
t+1, implying that q(kt+1;￿) < 0 for
kt+1 2 R++n[kd
t+1;kn
t+1], and both numerator and denominator of q(￿) are non-positive for kt+1 2
[kd
t+1;kn
t+1]. In this case yM
t+1 = 0 since physical and human capital are indisputable to generate
the manufacturing good. The economy will fully specialize in agriculture. As a result, individuals
with perfect foresight do not save and spend all their bequests on education.
Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose HA
t = HA
0 . Then HM
t = Ht ￿ HA
0 > 0 and thus (23) yields kt > 0. Also, one can use
(7) and (19) to get IP
t = wt = ptFH(X;HA




0 ) satisfy (28) and IP
t < pt^ c < IR
t holds in the equilibrium.
Recalling Corollary 1, the uniqueness of HA





t ￿ pt^ c occurs in other equilibria. Case (a) implies ^ c ￿ FH(X;HA




t < ^ c, which violates (28). In case (b), (10) and (13) yield cR
t ￿ ^ c and
43
Endogenous Globalization and Income Divergence 
EUI WP ECO 2005/3Bt = 0; thus HA
t = Ht > HA
0 . Noting (31), this leads to cR






















Proof of Lemma 3
Noting (8), (24), (38) and (39), one can ￿nd that the ￿rst and second brackets in (40) respectively





t for a su¢ ciently large value of Bt: Using wM
t = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)yM
t =HM
t ; one can ￿nd that
y
M;w




￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)
HM























Since (38) and (39) imply the strict concavity of yM

















t for a su¢ ciently large value of Bt: ￿
Proof of Lemma 4
As follows from (13) and (19), the evolution of bP
t conditional on kt+1 = k is
bP
t+1 = ￿ max[I(bP









t ) for bP
t < e(k)
w(k)h(e(k)) + R(k)[bP




EUI WP ECO 2005/3Noting w(^ k_ ) = pw^ c and ￿R(^ k) > 1 from (A4);
0 = ’(0;^ k) and ’b(bP
t ;^ k) > 1; 8bP
t > 0:
Therefore, this ￿rst-order di⁄erence equation has no steady state if k > ^ k and R(k) > 1; otherwise
it has a unique steady-state.
In addition, one can ￿nd
’k(bP
t ;k) > 0 for bP
t < e(k);
’k(bP
t ;k) < 0 for bP
t ￿ ￿ bP and k ￿ ￿ k;







t ) for bP
t < e(k)
(1 ￿ ￿)R(k)[h(e(k)) ￿ bP
t =k] for bP
t ￿ e(k):
The results above characterize the relationship between bP
t and k implied by bP
t = ’(bP
t ;k):
By noting (24) and (A3), one can map this relationship onto the bb locus on the (Bt;bP
t ) space to
establish the result. ￿
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